tions and challenges for the sake of discussion, but, alas, Gary was not well at the time and did not attend. Now that I am putting this on paper, I am recasting my points: no longer questions, but a single claim that such economic theories can never be more than a limited or partial hermeneutics: Section I, below. The historical and political dimension needs to be added to liberal economics.
Only after the panel had adjourned was I able to read with sufϐi-cient care Gary's later book, a huge and comprehensive philosophical study, On Suffering. 3 Though it was not mainly on economics, I was able to see in this book a vision of the more complete human scene which I had originally found missing. So in Section II I shall add some remarks on this book, seen as a universal hermeneutics.
I. Good Will and Its Limits
In a number of essays beginning in the ͧͦ͟͞s, Gary offered an economic theory that linked it intimately to hermeneutics, the latter having been for a long time the focus of his work. Above all, hermeneutics shows how we understand one another: it shows that the linguistic event of conversation (especially in question and answer) induces a disposition of good will and therefore mutual understanding. Let me cite a statement that I think embodies Gary's deepest commitment: "The hermeneutical notion of "good will" points to a core concept of democratic pluralism: The other may possibly be right over against oneself and thus must be accorded a freedom equal to one's own." 4 This is not some particular method we adopt, nor does Gary advise us how to conduct a conversation. His hermeneutics is not prescriptive but descriptive. That is why he can afϐirm Gadamer's thesis of the "universality of hermeneutics" as belonging to any cases where there is understanding at all. (PP, ͦͤ͟-ͦͦ) The very use of language brings me to form a sort of solidarity with my interlocutor: what is called tolerance should not be grasped as a moral or political "value," but rather as imposed on us ontologically through the whole event of communication (which of course reϐlects our solidarity as a species). Here Gary brings Gadamer's central doctrine of application to bear-understanding is fulϐilled precisely in the circumstance where I apply the other's viewpoint to my own existence. The meaning of the other's discourse is discerned when I undertake the serious task of applying it to myself.
I have no challenge to pose to this account of understanding and interpretation. Instead, I want to bring forward a typical situation, very prominent in our own time, that might appear to pose a challenge to Gary's hermeneutical theory of good will. My point will be to show that it is by no means a counter-instance to hermeneutics, but rather a predicament of modern life to which Gary's kind of hermeneutics is able to offer a satisfactory response. I am thinking of religious fundamentalism.
In most of the forms of this known to us, whether Christian or otherwise, fundamentalism is among other things a refusal to engage in conversation with an external public: it is a posture of denial. Generally, adherents of a fundamentalist sect also refuse to engage in inter-religious, ecumenical conversation as well (although some such conversations may take place). Now a hermeneutical philosopher who undertakes to engage them in conversation will certainly have the experience of stout resistance on their part. It may seem then that the doctrine of the "good will" has run up here against its limit, an impenetrable barrier. But that is not really the case. Though the discussion partner may not budge, it cannot have been the philosopher's main aim in such a conversation to dislodge the fundamentalist from his or her religion. Hermeneutics is not propaganda, and such propaganda is no expression of good will. Neither can the aim have been to turn the partner into another philosopher or hermeneutical philosopher. Socrates in his conversations hoped that his interlocutors would think-but it was not his purpose to make an interlocutor into a second Socrates. The hermeneutics of good will enables the philosopher to understand the resistance and the resister. Gadamer showed Habermas that when a psychoanalyst encounters resistance, he or she does not cease to understand and interpret.
The hermeneutical philosopher, interacting with a fundamentalist, entertains the very darkness of the scripture and dogma, allows its irrational darkness to inhabit his or her understanding, grasping why the fundamentalist clings to these things so ϐirmly or desperately. In the programme of hermeneutics, the very concept of truth must be re-cast to ϐit the experience of the encounter. There is no "truth in itself," says Gary, but only the process of communication in which some truth can be afϐirmed. (PP, ͦͥ͟)
Let us now turn to economics. Gary's own initiatives in this ϐield derive from his doctrine of application: if hermeneutics is the theory of understanding and meaning in general, then social sciences are special cases of that theory, as applied hermeneutics. Economics must understand that its domain is that of human interaction, a part of the life-world, so that it must free itself from "physics-envy" and let go of abstractions like equilibrium and the homo economicus. This is a position on the philosophy of social science that I think we should all accept. To go more into detail, then, what economic phenomena does the hermeneutical approach highlight? 5 Economics is the theory of the market: it accounts for the activity of agents who offer goods and services in exchange for money. For Gary, however, the fundamental economic phenomena are prices. They must be understood in terms of communication; the merchant indicates what he is demanding, so the purchaser is now able to decide what to prioritize among his or her options. Prices are not metaphorically, but actually, a branch of language. Concluding a sale is therefore like reaching an agreement in discourse. The marketinteraction of all the individuals is one form of conversation. Thus the rationality of market behavior is a form of communicative rationality, not instrumental rationality. The market with its prices is a human product, but not the result of design or planning-like language itself, it is a spontaneous order, "the result of the independent action of a myriad of economic agents seeking to better their own lives." (PP, ͧ͟͞) It should not be confused with the ϐirm, which is the product of design from an individual or group. This is the grounding for Madison's most pointed and characteristic doctrine: that the market has to be inherently a free market, not constrained by social planning. With Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek, he argues that by allowing each agent to pursue self-interest we shall be led, as by an invisible hand, to bring about the common good.
I call attention to a prominent, important argument on that same page that reaches a substantive conclusion from a methodological premise: since we can best understand a free market economy through hermeneutical thinking, it follows that such an economy is the best economy "since only it conforms to the normative values of hermeneutics." (PP, ͧ͟͞) I am not quite sure of the reasoning here, but it seems that the normative values in question can be summarized in the doctrine of the good will. The question, then, that I pose to Gary is whether the communicative rationality of the good will in the market economy runs into serious limits.
One obvious question is whether Gary's hermeneutical approach has any way of understanding and affecting the relations of unequal power that seem to arise in every free-market economy. If there are concentrations of capital, if there are monopolies, if there are cartellike concentrations of industry, if wages are held low because of those and similar factors, if the real estate market seems unable to supply adequate housing for all-then we appear to have a market system notably lacking in good will. No doubt Gary has given these problems some thought, but he never appears to have addressed them in writing.
A more theoretical question, suitable to a philosophical discussion, concerns the location of his ideal free market within the larger contexts provided by the nation state and economic history. (͟) The nation state issues currency, it issues bonds, it imposes taxes, it builds infrastructure of all sorts (material and institutional), and above all it establishes regulatory mechanisms for banks, the stock markets and corporate life. Gary does not seem to wish to overthrow these institutions, but they represent an aspect of the economy that is not marked by his hermeneutical good will. They represent authority backed up by law. (͠) Much of our history in Canada occurred under pre-market conditions. I believe the Aboriginal history is described as a hunter-gatherer society; then there was the contact with explorers and settlers representing France and later Britain, which were European empires that instituted agricultural colonies, and then a mercantilist, European-oriented economy. Something like a free market economy emerged only in the ͧ͟ th century-and we need to grasp its relation to the earlier history. Even in Europe, Gary's free market only appeared, probably, in the ͦ͟ th century. The free market did not spring pristine from the head of Zeus: all this history has left many traces on our life. Does Gary's liberalism mean that he wants to erase these traces? That seems unlikely. On the other hand, Gadamer's hermeneutics in particular has great resources for grappling with the deep historical background of present-day institutions, so there is certainly some strand of hermeneutics that could be brought to bear here.
Gary is strongly opposed to a purely mechanistic picture of the free-market economy, insisting on its human and communicative character, but he appears to adhere to a school that wants to explain the rationality of the economy in abstraction from other dimensions, particularly the political dimension. This is where I see the limited hermeneutic. Up until the ͧ͟͠͞s or ͧ͟͡͞s, the customary approach was called "political economy." I believe that the economists of that time who cast off the encumbrance of political science were acting out of a positivistic view of their domain, separating it precisely from other elements of the life-world. I seem to get the idea that Gary too wants to formulate a "logic" for an economy that is independent of political supervision. But since there is a state, what kind of state or government does he envisage?
On the face of it, it is a "liberal" state that would be suitable for his "liberal" economy. In "Reinterpreting Civil Society" Gary sketches this in its main features: its commitment is to the individual, who is to be protected through the establishment of human rights. (PP, ͣ͟͠-ͤ͟) But this is not an ontological atomism: he argues effectively (replying to communitarian critics of liberalism) that individuality is not a fact of nature but a cultural value, established through intersubjective communication. Freedom is his highest value, but it is social. Nevertheless, human rights are mis-conceived when they are treated as entitlements, as in the misguided policies of the welfare state and social democracy. (PP, ͤ͠͠-ͥ͠) He shows his indignation over socialism so strongly that he is prepared to rebuke his former teacher, Ricoeur, for failing to preserve the purity of liberalism, for acknowledging that a liberal polity could, at times, advocate a socialist economy: " [Ricoeur] has wrongly suggested that [political liberalism] is compatible with various non-liberal economic arrangements." (PP, ͧ͟͞) Gary appends a note in which he quotes the following passage from Ricoeur's Main Trends in Philosophy: "This political liberalism sometimes aligns itself with (and at others runs counter to) the desire to bring into being economic and social structures which would ensure to each and all the material conditions necessary for realizing freedom" and then comments: "Ricoeur's error…is to imply that liberalism in politics can be combined with socialism in economics. (PP, ͧͤ n.ͣ͠) This disagreement brings to a head the deep ambiguity of the word "liberal." The original European meaning implied the freeing-up of economy and society from the constraints of monarchy, aristocracy and church-valorizing the free market in the economy and the rights of individuals in political society, causes advocated by such ͧ͟ th century parties as the Italian Liberal Party, the British Liberal Party, the German Free Democrats, and others. This is close to the use of the term in contemporary economic theory too, I believe. Gary is adhering to this sense of "liberal." But in contemporary North American politics, the meaning has undergone a virtual reversal. In the U.S.A., a liberal is one who defends government intervention into the economy, not only in welfare measures but in macro-economic manipulation-the heritage of the New Deal. In Canada, the small-l liberal is one who endorses the broadest application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We have to say that it is Ricoeur who adheres to the modern North American political sense of the term.
II. On Human Suffering
Gary's book On Suffering is sub-titled Philosophical Reϔlections on What It Means to be Human, expressing the point that a phenomenology of suffering sufϐices to open up the whole integrated totality of our existence and its meaning. In this he succeeds very well. While he understands a pain to be in each case an isolated, typically bodily event whose cause can be established, suffering by contrast possesses meaning that reaches through our existence-differentiated from pain just as our anxiety is differentiated from our fears. And from the start, he has found that his phenomenological approach to suffering was anticipated by two ancient schools whose sophistication he underlines: Western Stoicism and Eastern Buddhism.
These two schools are allied with phenomenology in Gary's vindication of the philosophy of suffering versus the science of pain. Chapters ͠ and ͡ constitute a rigorous and convincing assault on today's mechanism and materialism, establishing the integrated totality of "being human," the proper ontology of the human being. They anticipate later chapters that turn more directly to the medical, psychiatric, therapeutic applications of the ϐlawed materialist ontology, whose simple approach is the reduction of all suffering to pains, with the promise of one therapy or another to "relieve your pain." Gary is by no means anti-physician or anti-psychiatry; rather, he seeks to establish the humanist and philosophical status of authentic medicine and psychiatry, quoting many inspiring practitioners such as Eric Cassell and Jerome Groopman.
Here I propose an analogy. Just as the faulty materialist agenda preens itself on its "scientiϐic" status, versus a genuinely philosophical comprehension of being human, so it was with the neoliberal economics, which purported to establish a science of value and exchange, outside the horizon of history and politics. Neoliberal economics stays outside the totality of the human community just as scientism falls outside the totality of being human.
I should not only refer to Gary's detailed critiques of the theories of scientists and philosophers who have sought to eliminate mind, consciousness, and so on; and not only his insightful exposure of pseudo-therapies that are based on these false ontologies. I shall call attention as well to his shrewd appraisal of the popular prophets of scientism in the public domain. Our times are marked by shrill polarization, and in the domain of intellect and culture, a loud voice belongs to those who have taken up the mandate to launch a frontal attack on religion. One aspect of the campaign is to assign all religion to the camp of fundamentalism, reducing it all, airbrushing out all differences among denominations and differences between laypeople and theologians. Though there have been other sources of atheism in years past, I have in mind such people as Dawkins, Pinker, and Dennett 6 , who have the common feature of arguing that modern science has decisively eliminated God and the soul. Their books are not a contribution to biology or astronomy or psychology; they are not addressed to specialists in those ϐields. They are addressed to a broader public, but they invoke the authority of those sciences. Their genre is what Marilynne Robinson has appropriately called "parascientiϐic": not contributing to science, they make their appeal nevertheless to a public that has been conditioned to accept "science" as an authority, alleging that this science has now given the proofs for their materialist and atheist agenda. 7 Now Gary has shown that hermeneutics is able not only to enter into a conversation with real science-it is able to engage with this para-science as well. If it can understand the sciences, it can also understand the motives of those who display their reputed scientiϐic authority to a credulous public, instituting a new clerisy that replicates the features of an older oppressive clerisy of authoritarian religion. Hermeneutics can strive to understand why that public believes this para-scientiϐic philosophy, despite its weaknesses and faults. Coming to grips with the para-scientist, hermeneutics comprehends the unreasoned authority that "science" possesses for a contemporary public and why they need so desperately to be "with it."
The central chapter of the book presents a thorough phenomenology of suffering, as a way of opening out "the mystery of being." It is Gary's conviction that, while both pain and suffering can lead one to withdraw and become self-enclosed, that is not the necessary outcome. The ancient tragedies as well as the Stoics showed that human beings acquire wisdom from suffering; which is to say, in suffering, human beings are opened to the world as a whole, and to the greatest circumstance of all, that there is something rather than nothing. Here, Gary quotes de Unamuno's Tragic Sense of Life: "The capacity to enjoy is impossible without the capacity to suffer…. Suffering is the substance of life and the root of personality, for it is only suffering that makes us persons." 8 As Gary comments: "To be aware of the utter contingency of everything that is-the Nihil-is the necessary condition for experiencing joy in the presence of the wondrousness of the world and the superabundance of Being. Where there is no darkness there can be no light, where there is no adversity there can be no virtue-virtus, moral strength." 9 graemenicholson@gmail.com
